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In this study we investigated government hand in the Global Financial Crisis. Before, during and 
after crisis government attempted to solve and avoid the turmoil. But did he succeed?    
Beginning with low interest rates set by FED, US government political pressures to enable more 
Americans to buy homes, unrestrained financial system despite of regulations and fines, human 
greedy were the main reasons for Great Recession.  
More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions was 
the one big reason for crisis. Besides showing the stages crisis passed, the paper also examines 
penalties government gave to the financial intermediaries for breaking law in past related to 
crisis. Showing the emerging process of crisis, the article mainly restricted on US economy - 
where was the epicenter of problem - and government, while the U.S. financial system stumbles, 
it may take the rest of the world down with it. 
The actuality of the topic is that it was also a social crisis because, unemployment in US had 
reached to 50 millions which means they also lost their social insurances, and 16 million families 
had lost their homes. Several corporations bankrupted, in spite of more than these were saved by 
government. While financial crisis turned into social and economic turmoil it became 
government prior issue to solve. 
Keywords: Global Financial Crisis, US economy, government failure, crisis recovery 
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Introduction 
The recession officially began in December 2007. It peaked with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the potential collapse of the insurance giant AIG in September 2008.  
Before crisis, we can see a number of government social programs which abused by 
speculators and was one of the essential reasons of crisis. In the other side, lax regulation and 
incorrect orientation in monetary policy of US led to biggest crisis since Great Depression.  
The crisis occurred by U.S. financial system has significantly depressed economic activity 
during the last years, laying a serious threat to the country’s ability to quick return to a path of 
solid economic growth. One of the main reason for the crisis was the import of too much credit 
at too low a price as well as insufficient capital. As we know the US government role was huge 
in there pushing billion dollars into markets and allowing market to decide the future of global 
financial system. 
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Thus, the sudden shift to a much higher price for risk taking has led to a significant reduction 
in wealth and borrowing capacity; it has also forced a number of financial institutions to close 
and others to be merged with stronger operations. Those forces, in turn, are weighing heavily on 
consumption, the demand for housing, and businesses’ investment. 
Policymakers have responded to the financial turmoil with a set of unprecedented actions. 
Thus far, a systemic collapse of the financial system has not occurred, and conditions have 
improved noticeably in some financial markets. 
The enormous monetary and fiscal policy actions of the past years represent a graduated 
response to the unfolding crisis. When the first signs of financial turmoil emerged, it was not 
clear either to policymakers or to most other observers just how serious the crisis would become. 
But who were not inside these greedy crowd might notice falling knife. 
Businesses are care about only on their own future, mostly near future in this context. 
Government is the liable and responsible organization to set the puzzle in the economy and 
predict the future. 
 In the United States, businesses were given an incentive to expand and create new jobs, with 
tax cuts and deductions, transfer payments and other policies to strengthen household income, 
promote investment and increase aggregate demand. 
Thus, sometimes problems may occur in private sector due to private sector mechanism. 
Only with government interfere it might be fixed. This calls in literature `market failure`. But 
sometimes it may occur because of government behavior. In this `government failure` case, 
problems might be solved changing government managing system. 
This study approaches to the problem mostly from `government failure` dimension and seeks 
government role on the eve of crisis.   
Government hand before crisis. 
After 1980`s, more “hot investment capital” began to flow into global markets—especially to 
the United States. At the same time, China, Japan and some OPEC countries invested into U.S. 
Treasury and other securities. While this led interest rates low, it also made mortgage interest 
rates at lower and attractive levels. The mortgage originators main purpose was to write 
mortgages using funds provided by financial institutions without watching risks carefully. They 
were paid for each originated mortgage but had no responsibility for loans gone bad. This was 
supported with political acts to make easier more Americans to buy homes (houses), in terms of 
the enlarging lending standards and the rise of subprime mortgages.  
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC 
hereafter). The FDIC insured bank deposits up to $2500; that limit climbed to $100.000 by 1980, 
and was raised to $250.000 during the crisis in 2008. Depositors no longer needed to worry 
about their money`s future. And if banks were constraint of cash, they could borrow from the 
Fed easily. Which means, Fed would support banks not to fail from a lack of liquidity (FCIC, 
2011). 
The Glass Steagall Act, among other changes, separated investment banks from commercial 
banks, and New Deal reforms protected market share for the highly regulated part of the 
financial sector.  
In 1977, Merrill Lynch issued something even more like a bank account: “cash management 
accounts” which allowed customers to write checks. Other money mutual funds followed (FCIC, 
2010). Consumers liked the higher interest rates even they were not protected by FDIC deposit 
insurance. Assets of mutual funds jumped from $3 billion in 1977 to more than $740 billion in 
1995 and $1.8 trillion by 2000 (Wilmarth, 2002). 
In 1960s, the commercial paper market jumped more than sevenfold and in 1970s it grew 
almost fourfold again. By 2000, commercial paper had risen to $1.6 trillion, 10 times more than 
1980 level. It seemed a win-win-win deal: the mutual funds could get a solid return, companies 
could borrow more cheaply and Wall Street firms could earn fees for putting the deals together 
(FCIC, 2011). 
“Reforms” occurred by neocons included privatization of Social Security, tightening 
bankruptcy law, transferring health care burdens to patients, replacing income and wealth taxes 
with consumption taxes, substituting “personal reemployment and training accounts” for 
unemployment benefits, large unemployment reliefs, “No Child Left Behind” and school 
vouchers legislation, transferring private pensions to defined contribution plans, the movement 
against government “takings,” and attempts to hand national resources over to private exploiters. 
In addition, “freeing” financial markets and money managers played a critical role in increasing 
homeownership—“success” of the ownership society policy envisioned by the neocons (Wray, 
2005). 
30-year mortgage introduced by New Deal government guarantees—making home 
ownership possible for low-income class for the first time—turned into a speculation-fueling, 
debt-pushing casino that bared home owners lots of liabilities. The program suggested the more 
ownership, the more vitality, which meant the more people will have a vital stake in the future of 
the country.  
Before 1968, Fannie Mae mostly held the mortgages it purchased, profiting of funds and the 
interest paid on these mortgages. The 1968 and 1970 laws gave Government Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs) another option: securitization. A lender would set a pool of mortgages and 
issue securities backed by the mortgage pool. These securities would be sold to investors, with 
Ginnie (who was first) guaranteeing timely payment of principal and interest. In 1971, Freddie 
began to buy mortgages, pool them, and sell mortgage-backed securities and also charged for 
guarantee as well as Ginnie.  
In 1980s and 1990s, the conventional mortgage market expanded, the GSEs grew 
significantly, and the market share of the FHA (The Federal Housing Administration) and VA 
(the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs) declined. Fannie and Freddie had missions to support 
the mortgage market and maximize returns for shareholders. They did not originate mortgages; 
they purchased them—from banks, thrifts, and mortgage companies—and either held them in 
their portfolios or securitized and guaranteed them. Congress granted both enterprises special 
privileges thru exemptions from state and local taxes and a $2.25 billion credit line each from the 
Treasury. The Federal Reserve provided services such as electronically clearing payments for 
GSE debt and securities as Treasury bonds. Which allowed Fannie and Freddie to borrow at least 
rates as the Treasury paid. Federal laws allowed for investment in GSE securities with relatively 
favorable capital requirements and no limits (FCIC, 2011). 
The government sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were enhanced to expand 
and buy mortgage backed securities, including `risky` sub-prime mortgages. The Federal 
Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005 legislation, to control these excesses, was 
not passed into law. These actions should be added to the list of government interventions that 
were part of the problem (Taylor, 2008). 
Securitization of mortgages began in the early 1980s. In the new policy regime, no financial 
institution could stand with long term fixed rate mortgages. Therefore, regulators released banks 
and thrifts to pursue higher revenue, and of course riskier activities.  
Most of the mortgages originally securitized in standards put by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac that were covered by semi-government insurance. Strong underwriting standards and the 
guarantee revealed that these mortgages were virtually risk-free, in other words, the securities 
based on mortgages were also safe.  
However, managed money had an appetite for risk and its accompanying high return. 
Therefore, riskier assets, including Alt-A and subprime mortgages (riskier than prime loans) 
were also securitized. For several reasons, securities based on non-conforming loans are much 
more difficult to value: these instruments have less history to calculate default probabilities and 
peculiar loans packaged together make it harder to see the overall risk. One of the advantages is 
to diversify risks if default probabilities of mortgages underlying a security are uncorrelated. So 
how can one value a security? It can be obtaining default probabilities for each mortgage 
included in the package, then assess the correlation of these probabilities.  
It resulted that futures prices surged after 2000 as money flowed into markets, from pension 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, and foreign banks. This fortified some factors that 
pushed up prices, including rapid growth in China and India as well as some supply constraints 
and inventory manipulation. Government policies, especially export restrictions and US biofuels 
incentives, had also act a part. These policy choices were supported by rising commodities 
prices. A perfect scene was created in a way almost every participant’s interest lay in continued 
price gains. Similarities with the real estate boom are notable (Wray, 2009). 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has been part of U.S. Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) since 1965. FHA mortgages are the most popular non-conventional 
mortgages offering a 3.5% down payment minimum, low closing costs and easy credit qualifying 
for homebuyers who are not able to afford the 20% down payment of conventional loans. 
In the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, Congress 
extended HUD’s privilege to set affordable housing goals for Fannie and Freddie. In 1995, 
President Bill Clinton announced an initiative to boost homeownership from 65.1% to 67.5% of 
families by 2000, and one component raised the affordable housing goals at the GSEs. Between 
1993 and 1995, almost 2.8 million households entered the ranks of homeowners, nearly twice 
comparing the previous two years. There were opened new way home for the American middle 
class. This method continued by President George W. Bush, who, introduced a “Zero Down 
Payment Initiative” that under certain circumstances could remove the %3 down payment rule 
for first-time home buyers with FHA-insured mortgages (FCIC, 2011). 
Government over time had charged several financial organizations for breaking law which 
federal and local governments prohibited to do in derivative markets. There were several 
examples. 
In 1996 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC hereafter) charged $150 
million in penalties and restitution the Japan’s company Sumitomo (which lost $2.6 billion in 
that operation) with using derivatives to manipulate copper prices and also to disguise the 
speculation and to finance the scheme. The CFTC also charged $15 million Merrill Lynch with 
intentionally misdirect copper prices (CFTC, 1996). 
In 2004 Fed set $70 million penalty (plus $30 million in restitution to borrowers) to 
CitiFinancial, for accusing the unit of selling credit insurance to borrowers without checking if 
they would qualify for a mortgage (O’Brien, 2004). 
In 2002 Household Finance (later acquired by HSBC) was ordered to pay $484 million in 
penalties and restitution to consumers. In 2004, Fannie and Freddie had violated accounting rules 
and faced corrections and fines. Struggling to remain dominant in securitization market, they 
loosened their underwriting standards, purchasing or guaranteeing riskier loans, and increasing 
securities purchases. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO hereafter) 
focused more on accounting and other operational issues than on Fannie’s and Freddie’s 
increasing investments in risky mortgages and securities. In December 2003, Freddie agreed 
with OFHEO to pay a $125 million penalty and correct governance, internal controls, 
accounting, and risk management. In 2006, OFHEO reported that Fannie had overstated earnings 
from 1998 through 2002 by $11 billion and that it, too, had manipulated accounting in ways 
influenced by compensation plans. Fannie was fined $400 million. In 2008 the OFHEO, the 
regulator of the GSEs reported significant rise in the incidence of fraud in mortgage lending in 
2006 and the first half of 2007 (OFHEO, 2006). 
In 2008 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a civil fraud lawsuit 
against Goldman Sachs. (Goldman agreed to pay for a “mistake” a fine of $550 million, without 
admitting guilt) The SEC claims Goldman sold CDOs to investors without informing them that it 
allowed a hedge fund that was shorting the CDOs to select the underlying MBS (Wray, 2008). 
According to Mortgage Market Statistical Annual Report 2009, subprime private label 
mortgage backed securities (PMBS) issued by Wall Street increased from $87 billion in 2001 to 
$465 billion in 2005; the value of Alt-A mortgage–backed securities increased from $11 billion 
to $332 billion. 
In 2002, PMBS had reached $100 billion. The issuances of PMBS that year totaled $134 
billion, of which $43 billion in PMBS were issued by Wall Street financial institutions. In 
following years, as the market grew, Wall Street institutions fell below the major subprime 
issuers, so by 2005 only Lehman was among the top five issuers and Wall Street issuers as a 
group were only 27 percent of the $507 billion in that year (MMSA, 2009). 
In 2007, the notional value of CDS’s had reached $62 trillion, more than the combined GDP 
of the entire world which was $54 trillion. By July 2008, it declined to $54.6 trillion and by 
October 2008 to $46.95 trillion. The system generated large profits for the companies until the 
default, and the number of bankruptcies began to soar. Soon newly generated outsized profits 
began to generate outsized losses, and in October 2008, losses became huge for companies 
(Nanto, 2009). 
The number of suspicious activity reports related to mortgage fraud grew 20-fold between 
1996 and 2005 and then more than doubled again to 2009 (FCIC, 2011). 
When the Federal Reserve cut interest rates early in the new century and mortgage rates fell, 
home refinancing surged, climbing from $460 billion in 2000 to $2.8 trillion in 2003 (MMSA, 
2009). 
From 1978 to 2007 the amount of debt held by the financial sector soared from $3 trillion to 
$36 trillion, more than doubling as a share of GDP. The nature of many Wall Street firms 
changed taking greater and more diverse risks. By 2005, the 10 largest U.S. commercial banks 
held 55% of the industry’s assets (FCIC, 2011). 
By 2005 and 2006 Wall Street was securitizing one-third more loans than Fannie and 
Freddie. In just two years, PMBS had grown more than %30, reaching $1.15 trillion in 2006, 
which 71% were subprime or Alt-A (MMSA, 2009). 
From 2001 to 2007, mortgage debt almost doubled, and mortgage debt per household rose 
more than 63% from $91,500 to $149,500, even wages were the same. When the housing 
downturn hit, heavily indebted financial firms and families were beaten hardly (FCIC, 2011). 
The risk wasn’t being taken on just by the big financial firms, but also by families. Nearly 
one in 10 mortgage borrowers in 2005 and 2006 took out “option ARM” loans, in which they 
might choose to make payments so low that their mortgage balances rose every month. The 
dangers of this debt were lifted up because transparency was not in question. During that year, 
68% of “option ARM” loans originated by Countrywide Financial and Washington Mutual had 
low documentation requirements (FCIC 2011). Subprime ARM loans (adjustable rate mortgages) 
built to people with credit scores high enough to get mortgages with better terms. Additionally, 
lending standards began to decline due to laws also. 
According to SCF-Chartbook, 2010 by FED, overall mortgage indebtedness climbed from $ 
5.3 trillion in 2001 to $10.5 trillion in 2007. The amount of mortgage debt per household rose 
from $91.500 to $ 149.500 between these years. 
From 2000 to 2007 Moody’s rated nearly 45.000 mortgage-related securities as triple-A. In 
2006 alone, Moody’s put its triple-A stamp of approval on 30 mortgage-related securities every 
working day (FCIC, 2011). 
The U.S. government’s housing policies were the major contributor to the financial crisis. 
These policies accelerated the development of a massive housing bubble between 1997 and 2007 
and the creation of 27 million subprime and Alt-A loans, which most were ready to default as 
soon as the housing bubble began to deflate (FCIC 2011) 
Government role during the crisis.  
The recession officially began in December 2007. According to the most recent US 
government statistics, its effects on the job market were the worst in history as reflected in rise of 
underemployed workers, and millions of Americans were and still are suffering without work. 
In the last years preceding the downturn, there were many signs that house prices were 
inflated, that too many homeowners were taking on mortgages and debt they could barely afford, 
and that risks to the financial system were growing unchecked. Many knowledgeable executives 
saw trouble ahead and tried to avoid, while countless Americans joined in the financial stream 
that seized the nation. Others were shouting to government officials, pointing to what would 
become a human disaster, not just an economic debacle (FCIC, 2011). 
The economy shed 3.6 million jobs in 2008. The underemployment rate
‡
 increased from 
8.8% in December 2007 to 13.7% in December 2008, reached 17% in November 2010. The 
average length of time individuals spent unemployed spiked from 9.4 weeks in June 2008 to 18.2 
weeks in June 2009, and 25.5 weeks in June 2010. 59% of all job seekers, searched for work for 
at least 15 weeks. The labor market was daunting across the board, but it was especially bad 
among African American workers, whose jobless rate is 16%, about 6% points above the 
national average; workers between the ages of 16 and 19 years old, at 24.6%; and Hispanics, at 
13.2%. And the impact has been especially severe in certain professions: unemployment in 
construction, for instance, climbed to an average of 19.1% in 2009, and averaged 20.6% during 
the first 11 months of 2010 (FCIC, 2011). 
In the bailout process, the government rescued several financial institutions called “too big to 
fail”§, while provided substantial financial assistance to nonfinancial corporations. 
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 The total of unemployed workers who are actively looking for jobs, those with part-time work who would prefer 
full-time jobs, and those who need jobs but say they are too discouraged to search 
§
 so large and interconnected with other financial institutions or so important in financial markets that their failure 
would have caused cascading losses and failures in other institutions or markets 
When the housing bubble inflated and crisis launched, derivatives were in the first rank. The 
government concluded AIG was too big to fail and allocated more than $180 billion to its rescue.  
Without access to credit, and with uncertainty about the future of economy, corporations laid 
off workers or cut their investments, while others bankrupted.  
In 2009, 57% of U.S. companies were affected by credit constraints, leading to decisions to 
cut employment by 11%, technology spending by 22%, capital investment by 9%, marketing by 
33%, and dividends by 14%. And small businesses particularly felt the squeeze, which employ 
nearly 40% of the private-sector workforce. Unlike the large firms, which had come to rely on 
capital markets for borrowing, these companies had generally obtained their credit from 
traditional banks, other financial institutions, nonfinancial companies, or personal borrowing by 
owners. The financial crisis disrupted all these sources, making credit scarcer and more 
expensive (Campello et al., 2010). 
Faced with financial difficulties, over 1.4 million households declared bankruptcy in 2009, 
up from roughly 1.1 million in 2008 (ABI, 2010). But even with the central bank’s help, nearly 
70% of banks tightened credit standards and lending by 2009. 
The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 provided roughly $170 billion in tax rebates for 
households and tax incentives for businesses. In October 2008, at the top of the crisis, the $700 
billion TARP was enacted; Aside from its emergency lending programs during the financial 
crisis, the Fed put about $1.7 trillion into the economy from September 2008 to October 2010, 
mainly by buying financial assets such as mortgages-backed securities and Treasury bonds, a 
process described as “quantitative easing.” And in November 2010, there were announced 
another $600 billion in easing, designed to keep both long-term and short-term interest rates 
down (FCIC, 2011). 
Fed’s primary role at the investment banks during the crisis was not as a regulator but as a 
lender through the new emergency lending facilities (Bernanke, 2010). Mainly, Central Banks 
are not players in the markets, but regulators above them. 
According to report of Congressional Budget Office, in October 2010, the Treasury 
Department reported that the TARP program would cost far less than the $700 billion that 
Congress had appropriated in the fall of 2008, because banks had begun to repay the Treasury in 
2009. In fact, Treasury announced, TARP would wind up costing about $29 billion, mostly 
owing to the bailout of the automakers General Motors and Chrysler and the mortgage 
modification program. Overall, as spending increased during the recession, the federal deficit 
grew from $459 billion in 2008 to $1.4 trillion in 2009 (CBO, 2010). 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-controlled companies had more than 71% of 
mortgage-backed bonds during 2007. Guarantees loans insured by the Federal Housing 
Administration, the government backed (either written or guaranteed) nearly 97 percent of U.S. 
mortgages in 2009. Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were seized by the government in 2008 
after losses on mortgage investments pushed them to the brink of collapse, taxpayers have 
injected almost $150 billion to keep them solvent (Woellert, 2010). 
Officials in US announced a $25 billion settlement of foreclosure-abuse allegations with the 
five largest mortgage servicing firms: Bank of America Corp., Wells Fargo & Co., J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc. and Ally Financial Inc. As part of the state-federal settlement, the 
Fed announced $766.5 million in fines against these banks. 
Under the Fed’s sanctions, Bank of America will pay $175.5 million, Wells Fargo will pay 
$87 million, JPMorgan Chase $275 million, Citigroup $22 million and Ally Financial pay $207 
million. In the other hand, consumers are eligible for $1.5 billion in cash payments who went 
through foreclosure between September 2008 and December 2011 (Zibel, 2012). 
The bailout program and cost of government will be ended by next decade through 
Congressional Budget Office, FED, and FHFA (Federal Housing Finance Agency) with other 
officials. 
Policies and Impacts 
The vigorous monetary and financial policy actions of the past years responded to the crisis. 
When the first signs of financial turmoil emerged, it was not clear either to policymakers or to 
most participants just how serious the crisis would become. The Federal Reserve first began to 
supply additional liquidity to credit markets in August 2007 as pressures from losses on 
mortgage-related assets. In the following years, the central bank increased the funds it was 
providing by creating a number of new lending facilities to address emerging problems among 
financial institutions and in certain markets. It also expanded arrangements to banks charge each 
other for overnight loans of their monetary reserves, almost to zero by late 2009. 
Policymakers also took a series of significant measures to prevent the problems with 
solvency, which have improved conditions in some financial markets and thus far reduced the 
risk of a financial meltdown (CBO, 2009). 
- Fed, in consultation with the Department of the Treasury, facilitated the sale of the 
investment bank Bear Stearns to the commercial bank JPMorgan Chase, in March 2008, by 
lending $29 billion to a newly formed Maiden Lane LLC, against a $30 billion portfolio of 
Bear Stearns’s less liquid assets. 
- FHFA -as a regulator- took Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under protection, and the Treasury 
planned to issue up to $100 billion of capital into each of the institutions by purchasing a 
share, or ownership. 
- Fed extended a $60 billion line of credit to the AIG. Additionally, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York arranged to lend up to $52.5 billion to two newly formed LLCs to fund 
purchases of residential mortgage-backed securities and CDOs from AIG’s securities 
portfolio. 
- The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 created the $700 billion Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), which began purchasing preferred stock of commercial banks in late 
October. Most of the first half of that fund has been used to supply banks directly with 
capital.  The law also temporarily raised the ceiling on deposit insurance from $100,000 to 
$250,000 per depositor. 
- The Treasury, Fed, and FDIC jointly announced agreements with Citigroup and Bank of 
America to provide each with a package of asset guarantees, access to liquidity, and capital. 
- The FDIC created the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program in October 2008 to bring 
confidence and enhance liquidity in the banking system. The program guarantees certain 
newly issued unsecured debt of banks, thrifts and provides full deposit insurance coverage 
for certain checking and non-interest-bearing deposit accounts, regardless of amount.  
The global financial crisis was the consequence of the financialization process, or the 
creation of massive financial wealth and of the reactionary ideology based on self-regulated and 
efficient markets.  In the other side, monetary policy after 2001–2 kept interest rates too low for 
too long—which increased credit supply to produce the high leverage levels associated with the 
crisis. Nourishing credit expansions with a major deregulation similarly occurred in the 1980s is 
a major historical fact explaining the crisis. The policy mistake that Greenspan recognized 
publicly in 2008 was not related to his monetary policy but to his support for deregulation 
(Bresser-Pereira, 2010). 
There are some explanations for the reasons for the crisis: lax regulation and oversight, rising 
inequality that encouraged households to borrow to cover spending, greed and irrational 
profusion, and excessive global liquidity − induced by US current account deficits that exported 
around the world with too many dollars (Wray, 2011). 
It is also a social crisis because, according to the International Labor Organization, 
unemployment has grown from around 20 million to 50 million by the end of 2009, whereas, 
according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, as the incomes of the poor were falling due 
to the crisis but the international prices of food commodities remained high, the number of 
undernourished people in the world increased by 11 percent in 2009, and, for the first time, 
exceeded 1 billion (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). 
Some basic figures speak for themselves: global financial assets rose from $12 trillion in 
1980 to $196 trillion in 2007. Global cross-border capital flows more than doubled between 2002 
and 2007, with foreign investors holding one in four debt securities and one in five equities. 
While in 2000 only 11 countries had financial assets of more than 350% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), 25 countries had deepened their financial markets to the same extent by 2007. As 
early as 1990, money managers had increased their control of US corporate equities from 8% in 
1950 to 60%.  In the period from 1986 to 2006, the US financial sector as a whole increased its 
share of corporate profits from 10% to 30%, while its outstanding debts grew from 20% of GDP 
in 1980 to 116% in 2007 (Blankenburg and Palma, 2009). 
The United States allotted a total of $100 billion to infrastructure: over $17 billion in public 
transit and high-speed rail, $40 billion for roads, bridges, dams, water, and $7 billion to expand 
broadband access. Also government is planning to increase R&D investments. Significant 
stimulus packages allocated for key science agencies such as the National Science Foundation 
($3 billion), the Department of Energy’s Office of Science ($1.6 billion), NASA ($1 billion), the 
Advanced Research Project Agency-Energy to support high-risk, high payoff research ($400 
million), the National Institutes of Health ($10 billion) among others (FCIC, 2011). 
These packages also plan to reduce the dependence on oil, doubling renewable energy 
production, fostering green technology research, and transforming the US energy transmission, 
distribution, and production system. Households with less income will receive aid and tax credits 
to better protect their homes from the weather. $30 billion is on spent energy initiatives such as a 
new, smart power grid, advanced battery technology, and energy efficiency measures. The 
stimulus bill is allocating funds for “smart” technologies, a total of about $11 billion (OECD, 
2009). 
The government’s fiscal initiatives launched while the recession started. The Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008, as a first stimulus package, involved temporary conforming loan limit 
increase for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and FHA. Most taxpayers below the income limit 
received a rebate of at least $300 each (ESA, 2008). 
Second stimulus package enacted since the beginning of the recession. According to The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), to stimulate the weakening 
economy there were signed $787 billion package which contained roughly $288 billion in tax 
relief and $499 billion in spending, which $224 billion for education and health care, as well as 
extending unemployment benefits and $275 billion for federal contracts, grants and loans 
(ARRA, 2009). 
The stimulus packages included pledges on transparency and accountability, such as that all 
contracts and grant permissions will be posted publicly, that investments will be vetted and 
reviewed and whistleblowers protected.  
According to ‘Inside Mortgage Finance Publications’, 50% of housing market is distressed 
property transactions. Also, in some states were natural disasters. These all results 16 million 
(family) foreclosures.  
As people lost jobs, many also lost their health insurance. And their sickness grew up due to 
joblessness and they could not afford medicines. In other side, after foreclosure, they cannot 
maintain their life. 
There were mainly two legislative actions: TARP - aimed at providing support for financial 
institutions and ARRA 2009 - aimed at providing stimulus to the economy. 
On June 17, 2009, the Department of the Treasury presented financial regulatory reform. The 
proposals dealt with five areas and established several control agencies: (Nanto, 2009). 
1. Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms. 
A new Financial Services Oversight Council to identify emerging systemic risks and improve 
interagency cooperation; New authority for the Federal Reserve to supervise all firms that could 
pose a threat to financial stability; Stronger capital and other prudential standards for all financial 
firms, and higher standards for large, interconnected firms; A new National Bank Supervisor; 
The registration of advisers of hedge funds and other private pools of capital with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
2. Built comprehensive supervision of financial markets. 
Regulation of securitization markets and all over-the-counter derivatives, including new 
requirements for market transparency, stronger regulation of credit rating agencies, and a 
requirement that issuers and originators retain a financial interest in securitized loans; 
3. Protect consumers and investors from financial abuse. 
A new Consumer Financial Protection Agency; Stronger regulations to improve the 
transparency, fairness, and appropriateness of consumer and investor products and services; 
4. Provide the government with the tools it needs to manage financial crises. 
A new regime to resolve nonbank financial institutions whose failure could have serious 
systemic effects; Revisions to the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority to increase 
accountability. 
5. Raise international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.  
Treasury proposed international reforms, including strengthening the capital framework; 
improving oversight of global financial markets; coordinating supervision of internationally 
active firms; and improving crisis management tools. 
Through TARP, the Treasury has invested in dozens of banks, insurers among other financial 
institutions. On March 23, 2009, $900 billion Public Private Partnership Investment Program 
signed by the U.S. Treasury in order to address toxic assets bared by the financial system. 
Fed also conducted about $1.2 trillion in emergency commitments to stabilize the financial 
sector. It was in terms of safety net for commercial banks, the rescue of Bear Stearns, a lending 
facility for investment banks and intermediates, loans for money-market assets and commercial 
paper, and purchases of securitized loans and asset-backed securities (Nanto, 2009). 
Estimated ARRA tax, entitlement, and contract, grant, and loan expenditures have been 
increased from $787 billion to $840 billion. $731.9 billion has been paid out already. 
According to Recovery Act, government has already paid out $ 290.7 billion in Tax Benefits, 
$249.5 billion in Entitlement Programs, $253.1 billion in Contract, Grant and Loan Programs, 
which recent list of all programs in a category: 
 Individual Tax Credits ($131.8 billion) including – First-Time Homebuyers, Transportation 
Subsidy, Education benefits, Earned Income Tax Credits. 
 Making Work Pay ($104.4 billion) including - $400 tax credit for working individuals; $800 
for working married couples. 
 Tax Incentives for Businesses ($32.6 billion) including - The Work Opportunity Tax Credit 
added unemployed veterans and 16-to-24 year olds to the list of new hires that businesses 
could claim.  
 Energy Incentives ($10.9 billion) including - Tax credits for energy efficient improvements 
to residences. Tax credits for alternative energy equipment, Electric Vehicles Tax Credit. 
 Manufacturing & Economic Recovery, Infrastructure Refinancing, Other ($7.3 billion) 
including - Tax-exempt bonds to expand industrial development. Bonds for investment in 
Infrastructure, job training, and education in high unemployment areas. Increased available 
New Market credits. 
 COBRA ($3.7 billion) including - Assistance with Continuation of Health Coverage. 
 Education ($92.3 billion) including - State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. Student Aid. Training 
and Employment Services. Special Education and Rehabilitative Services. 
 Transportation ($37.6 billion) Highway Infrastructure. High-Speed Rail Corridors. Grants 
for Railroads and Airports. 
 Infrastructure ($32 billion) including - Broadband. Federal Building Fund. Highway 
Construction. Rural Water and Waste Disposal Account. 
 Energy / Environment ($29.2 billion) including - Energy Efficient and Renewable Energy 
Program. Defense Environmental Clean-up. Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 
Program. Water and Related Resources Superfund Program. 
 Housing ($13.9 billion) including - Public and Indian Housing. Rental Assistance Programs. 
Homelessness Prevention Programs. Homeowners Assistance Fund. 
 R&D / Science ($15 billion) including - Fossil Energy R&D. National Science Foundation. 
National Institutes of Health. 
 Health ($9.8 billion) including - Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. Indian Health 
Service. Food & Nutrition Service. National Institutes of Health. 
 Family ($4.9 billion) including - Health Resources and Services. Veterans Health 
Administration. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Food and Nutrition Services. 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children. 
 Job Training/Unemployment ($4.7 billion) including - Community Service Employment for 
Older Americans. Training and Employment Services. Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services. Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers. 
 Public Safety ($5.4 billion) including - Wild land Fire Management. FEMA Firefighter 
Assistance Grants and Emergency Food and Shelter. Violence Against Women Programs. 
Customs and Border Protection. 
 Medicaid/Medicare ($100.9 billion) including - Medicaid Grants to States; Medicare 
HITECH Incentive Payments; Program Management. 
 Unemployment Insurance Programs ($61.1 billion). 
 Family Services ($47.1 billion) including - Foster Care and Adoption Assistance; Child 
Support; Food Stamp Program; Assistance for Needy Families. 
 Economic Recovery Payments ($13.8 billion) including - One-time $250 payments to Social 
Security beneficiaries; Railroad Board payments; Veterans payments. 
 Energy ($19.9 billion) including - Grants for Specified Energy Property in Lieu of Tax 
Credits; Bonneville Power Administration Fund; Western Area Power Administration, 
Borrowing Authority. 
 Housing ($5.6 billion) including - Grants to States for Low-Income Housing in Lieu of Low-
Income Tax Credits. 
 Agriculture ($0.95 billion) including - Assistance for Farm and Aquaculture Revenue Losses 
Due to Natural Disasters. Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers. 
 Other Programs ($5.9 billion) including - Some administrative and Operation Costs for 
Recovery Programs. Offices of the Inspectors General Recovery Administration Costs. 
Trillion dollars rescue packages are launched around the world, which will generate inflation 
and public debt, but will help to prevent others- food and economic crises. Many countries have 
cut taxes to strengthen household income, promote investment and increase aggregate demand. 
Businesses were given an incentive to expand and create new jobs. 
In addition, financial support has been channeled to specific industries, mostly the 
automobile industry in the United States, according to Auto Industry Finance and Restructuring 
Act of 2008, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on December 10, 2008. It was 
controversial that failure in this industry would have had a systematic adverse effect on the 
economy and therefore immediate facilities to restore liquidity and stability were required. The 
aid aimed to preserve 355,000 jobs in the industry and up to 4.5 million in related industries. 
The Stimulus package can solve the problems not just in a short run and some results are 
expected over decades: (Hassett, 2009) 
 The stimulus bill expanded several tax credits for low‐income families. It increased the 
earned income tax credit for working families with three or more children from 40 percent to 
45 percent, the maximum credit amount from $5,028 to $5,657, and the income phase‐out 
level for married couples. The total cost of the expansion is estimated at $4.7 billion; it will 
cost $32.9 billion over ten years. 
 The stimulus bill also expanded the home ownership credit to include additional incentives 
for first‐time home buyers. It increased the maximum credit to $8,000 for married couples 
and allowed the credit to be delivered as a cash grant instead of an interest‐free loan. The 
total cost of the credit is estimated to be $6.6 billion over ten years. 
 Extension to 2009 of enhanced expenses for small business, which allows businesses to 
instantly expense the first $25,000 of investment in equipment; it will cost $40 million. In 
addition, the stimulus extends bonus depreciation, which allows businesses to write off half 
the value of their qualifying investment in the year of equipment purchase. This policy, 
which was relied on during the previous downturn as well, has an estimated cost of $5.1 
billion. 
 To encourage consumer spending in the legislation is a large deduction for automobile 
purchases. Vehicle buyers would be deducted all state, local, and excise taxes paid on new 
vehicles up to a price of $49,500. The deduction would phase out over an income range of 
$125,000 to $135,000 for singles and $250,000 to $260,000 for married couples filing 
jointly. The provision is expected to cost $1.7 billion over ten years. 
 The new tax legislation indexes the 2008 thresholds for inflation, making the new threshold 
$46,700 for singles and $70,950 for married couples, which is estimated at $69.8 billion. 
 Tax incentives to deferral of certain income from the discharge of indebtedness ($1.6 billion 
over ten years), tax-preferred ‘‘Recovery Zone Bonds’’ targeted to depressed areas ($5.4 
billion over ten years), and the New Markets Tax Credit, a nonrefundable tax credit to 
investors who buy stock in companies investing in low-income areas ($815 million over ten 
years). The stimulus also generates $20 billion in new tax incentives for alternative energy 
sources. 
 Two top tax rates are increased from 33 and 35 percent to 36 and 39.6 percent, respectively, 
in 2011. The tax rate increases would generate $338.7 billion in revenue over ten years. 
Increasing the tax rate of long‐term capital gains and dividends from 15 to 20 percent and 
limiting the value of itemized deductions to 28 percent for taxpayers in the top two tax 
brackets, taxing carried interest as ordinary income. Those two policies would provide an 
increase in tax revenue of $118.1 billion and $317.5 billion, respectively. 
 Tax changes that would directly affect businesses propose eliminating capital gains taxes on 
small businesses, costing $7.2 billion over ten years. It also proposes making the research 
and experimentation (R&E) tax credit permanent, which provides a 20 percent nonrefundable 
tax credit for all R&E. The credit expansion will cost $74.5 billion over ten years. The 
budget also proposes a “cap and trade” regime, in which corporations would buy permits 
allowing them to emit a predetermined level of carbon dioxide. In many respects, the regime 
is similar to a carbon tax. The total climate revenues raised would equal $645.7 billion over 
ten years.  
By January 2009, US financial institutions had written off $1 trillion of losses. Even 
conventional projections expect another $3-5 trillion of write-offs. Congress allocated $700 
billion funds for asset and equity purchases, and for merger subsidies. The Fed’s balance sheet 
expanded to $2 trillion as it bought assets and lent reserves to US banks and to foreign central 
banks. US government accumulated commitments approach $9 trillion. Additionally securitized 
subprimes totaled $2.5 trillion. Certainly the losses are not simply a matter of bad mortgages for 
low income borrowers to buy unaffordable suburban mansions. Rather, this is a crisis of the 
money manager system. Due to most of it unregulated, unreported, and off-balance sheet, there 
is no way to assess the ultimate scale of losses (Wray, 2009). 
Financial and economic crises has left more than 26 million Americans who are out of work, 
cannot find full-time work, or have given up looking for work uncertain about their future 
prospects. About 4 million families have lost their homes to foreclosure and another 4.5 million 
have slipped into the foreclosure process or are seriously behind on their mortgage payments. 
Nearly $11 trillion in household wealth has vanished, with retirement accounts and life savings 
swept away. The collateral damage has been real people and communities. The impacts of the 
crisis are seems to be felt for a generation (FCIC, 2011). 
If these bailouts, stimulus packages were not necessary to prevent another crisis might be 
occurred and it would not have been necessary if the crisis was caused by actions of the 
government itself—then the Dodd-Frank Act (adopted by Congress in July 2010) seriously 
overreached (FCIC, 2011). 
The crisis revealed fundamental weaknesses in financial systems not only in US, but also 
worldwide. While coordinated policies by governments, trillions of dollars in intervention and 
huge fiscal stimulus packages, the crisis seems far from completely end. 
The global financial crisis has brought an important outcome: the United States is still a 
major center of the financial world. When the financial system in the U.S. stumbles, it may give 
to the rest of the world damage with it. The reason is that the United States is the main guarantor 
of the international financial system, the symbol of advanced capitalist economy since World 
War II, the provider of dollars as global currency and an international medium of exchange. 
Most scholar think to get rid of the crisis around world, firstly US has got to end this. Most 
economies will not recover until the US does. 
 
Conclusion 
On the one hand, US government spent lots of money to bailout financial organizations 
which at the same time caused the crisis. On the other hand, that was what government should 
do. We did expect this, because government`s hand was also in that balloon. And government 
couldn’t let it happen in that way. 
Despite government`s a little bit involvement in that problem, there were some attempts to 
curb the initial spark of turmoil with fine and penalties, FED regulations and other governmental 
economic, financial and social policies. 
Financial institutions made, bought, and sold mortgage securities they never examined, did 
not care to examine, or knew to be defective; firms depended on tens of billions of dollars of 
borrowing that had to be renewed each and every night, secured by subprime mortgage 
securities; and major firms and investors blindly relied on credit rating agencies as their arbiters 
of risk. 
Government (through FHFA, FED) found these institutions unsafe and unsound practices 
included the purchase and guarantee of higher-risk loan products before and on the eve of crisis. 
But it was either late or irrepressible. Without the bailout, defaults could have caused cascading 
losses and collapses in the overall financial system.  
Government`s prior role in this case is to avoid crisis or prevent the driving forces behind the 
crisis. Secondly, if there is crisis already occurred, government has to solve the problem with 
least cost. Let`s say, not to save all firms including key problem corporations. 
Problems may appear inside the economy, but only through government interference these 
hardships can be resolved.   
It is hard to predict, what would be government role in the next crisis, but it is clear that if 
that crisis would threat overall economy and social sphere, government will act instantly and in 
one path.  
Now, capitalism learned some lessons from last financial crisis, although they couldn’t treat 
at all. But remedies will make stronger and reliable global financial and economic system. 
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